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I. Introduction 
The promotion of entrepreneurship is a central priority of regional economic 
development (Lerner, 2009).  New firm formation plays a pivotal role in regional economic 
performance:  the growth of young firms is the source of nearly all net new employment 
(Haltiwanger et al., 2013), and a high rate of local entrepreneurship serves to maintain the 
competitiveness of local markets (Andersson & Henrekson, 2015).  There is likewise increasing 
appreciation for the role that start-up firms play in the overall innovation and commercialization 
process (Acs et al., 2009).  However, the outcomes from entrepreneurship are highly skewed, 
with a small number of firms accounting for the vast bulk of economic impact (Decker et al., 
2014).  Consequently, assessing the role of policy on entrepreneurship depends on evaluating not 
only its impact in terms of the number of new companies founded, but also on its potential for 
generating and increasing the realization of meaningful growth outcomes (Guzman & Stern, 
2016). 
One of the principal instruments that policymakers use to impact entrepreneurship is tax 
policy.  There is considerable evidence that the incentives to start and invest in the expansion of 
a business depends on the overall rate of taxation (Cullen & Gordon, 2007).  Indeed, an oft-cited 
justification for lower rates of taxation is the general encouragement of entrepreneurship 
(Reynolds et al., 1999; Gurley-Calvez & Bruce, 2013; Holtz-Eakin, 2000).  As the outsized role 
of innovation-driven start-ups in harnessing local knowledge spillovers and enhancing the 
comparative advantage of regions has come to the fore (Lanahan & Feldman, 2018; Delgado, 
Porter & Stern, 2015), policymakers have increasingly deployed focused tax policies such as the 
R&D tax credit for dual purposes:  (1) to spur investment in innovation by larger and more 
established companies (their original intended purpose); and (2) to encourage the formation of 
growth-oriented ventures and accelerate their performance (Miller & Richard, 2010; Wu, 2008; 
Bartik & Ebert, 2011). 
The primary contribution of this paper is to provide novel empirical evidence regarding 
the impact of state R&D tax credits on the quantity, quality and performance of entrepreneurship 
(that is, the realization of significant growth outcomes by new firms).  On the one hand, an 
emerging empirical literature has documented the impact of state R&D tax credits on R&D 
investment, innovation and overall economic performance (Wilson, 2009; Wu, 2005; Moretti & 
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Wilson, 2014; Lucking, 2019).  At the same time, since the work of Cullen and Gordon (2007) 
and Gentry and Hubbard (2004), there has been attention towards the overall impact of the tax 
system on the formation of new enterprises (Bruce, 2000; Gurley-Calvez & Bruce, 2013; Gentry 
& Hubbard, 2004; Cullen & Gordon, 2016).  And, there have been a small number of studies that 
have linked the R&D tax credit to the overall growth of high-technology sectors (Wu, 2008), or 
linked the adoption of such credits to the movement towards entrepreneurship for individuals 
working in companies impacted by the credit (Babina & Howell, 2018).  However, to date, there 
has been no paper that directly examines the overall impact of the R&D tax credit on the rate, 
nature and scaling of new businesses. 
At least in part, this gap in understanding arises from the fact that, among all new 
business starts, the nature of growth-oriented entrepreneurship is elusive.  The vast majority of 
new firms are founded with the intention to remain small businesses (Hurst & Pugsley, 2011).  
Only a very small fraction of startups experience the explosive growth (in terms of jobs, revenue, 
or valuation) that propels the economy and motivates economic development policy (Guzman & 
Stern, 2016).  And, at the time a company is founded, one cannot observe whether that particular 
firm will experience explosive growth (or not).  Evaluating the effectiveness of fiscal incentives 
such as the state R&D tax credit thus requires confronting a measurement quandary:  How do we 
identify whether state R&D tax credits are generating the formation and accelerating the 
performance of the types of startups that have the potential for exponential growth (Fazio et al., 
2016)? 
We overcome this impasse by extending our earlier work (Guzman & Stern, 2016) to 
leverage a novel dataset on tax incentives (Bartik, 2017).  Building on the methodology of 
Guzman and Stern (2016), we combine business registration records and predictive analytics to 
leverage founding choices that signal growth intention and model the relationship of these 
choices to later growth outcomes.  We use this mapping to prospectively account for differences 
in the growth potential (or quality) of startups at or near the time of founding and develop 
systematic measures of the quantity, quality-adjusted quantity, and scaling potential of 
entrepreneurship in a region (Guzman & Stern, 2015, 2016, 2017). We then consider the 
respective interactions of those measures with the availability (or absence) of state-level R&D 
tax credits.   
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More specifically, we combine data from the Startup Cartography project (SCP), tracking 
the quality, quantity, and performance of entrepreneurship, with data from the UpJohn Institute’s 
Panel Database on Incentives and Taxes (PDIT) (Bartik, 2017), tracking the availability and 
effective rates of state-level tax incentives.  Our resulting dataset includes entrepreneurship 
measures for all counties in 25 states from 1990 to 2010.  Using a difference-in-differences 
approach at the county-level, with year, county and pre-trend fixed effects, our core analysis 
evaluates how changes in the R&D tax credit impact the quantity, quality and performance of 
entrepreneurial activity.  In addition, as an exercise to consider the impact of tax credits that are 
more distant from the incentives for innovation-driven entrepreneurship, we repeat our analysis 
examining the impact of state-level investment tax credits using a similar difference-in-
differences framework. 
We find striking evidence for the long-term impact of the introduction of state R&D tax 
credits on the quantity and quality-adjusted quantity of entrepreneurship in a region.  Accounting 
for county and year fixed effects, as well as lagged state GDP, we find that the introduction of 
state R&D tax credits is associated with around 7% increase in the rate of net new business 
formation (both in terms of raw quantity and accounting for the heterogeneous firm potential for 
growth).  Moreover, this effect may underestimate the incentive’s actual long-term impact.  
While state-level R&D tax credits have little to no effect on the rate or composition of new firm 
formation in the first few years following their introduction, these incentives lead to a 20% 
increase in the quantity and quality-adjusted quantity of entrepreneurship over a ten year period 
(in the absence of any meaningful pre-adoption trend).  Notably, these impacts stand in sharp 
contrast to the effects of other contemporaneous state fiscal incentives supporting established 
firms – state-level investment tax credits.2  For the investment tax credit, we see at best a neutral 
impact in terms of the overall quantity of entrepreneurship, and a longer-term decline in the 
quality-adjusted quantity of new firms founded, suggesting that, by enhancing the 
competitiveness of established businesses, the investment tax credit might serve to deter growth-
oriented entrepreneurship over time. 
We conclude by observing that these results are informative for policy design.  Though 
                                                      
2 The PDIT panel centers on “incentives that are commonly used by medium to medium-large export-base firms” 
and excludes fiscal incentives geared towards incentivizing angel investment in pre-revenue startups. 
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initially aimed at fostering innovation by established enterprises, state R&D tax credits also 
increase the rate of entrepreneurship, and importantly, the formation of high growth potential 
startups needed to achieve economic development objectives.  However, the R&D tax credit 
does not offer a “quick fix” for states seeking to catalyze regional economic growth through 
entrepreneurship.  Importantly, increases in the formation of high potential growth firms only 
materialize over time in response to R&D credits.  Thus, it may take a decade or more for state 
R&D tax credits to have an impact on the economy through entrepreneurship.  More generally, 
tax incentives might be more effectively leveraged as one part of a broader complement of 
initiatives aimed at encouraging the formation and scaling of growth-oriented firms.  Overall, our 
findings counsel in favor of “patient” and targeted policy-- offering longstanding tax incentives 
tailored towards the revenue trajectories of high-potential growth startups and encouraging 
investment in initiatives, including public-private partnerships, that support this important 
category of newly-founded firms. 
 
II. R&D Tax Incentives And Regional Entrepreneurship: A Review Of The Evidence  
State R&D tax credits and other types of fiscal incentives have proliferated since 1981, 
when their counterpart at the federal level was first introduced (Wilson, 2009).3  Between 1981 
and 2006, 32 states introduced R&D tax credits and the average effective credit rate grew four-
fold (Wilson, 2009).  Though originally adopted as an economic development tool to support 
existing firms already conducting R&D (Miller & Richard, 2010), many state governments 
expected R&D tax credits would also help to advance their innovative capacity and industrial 
competitiveness either by creating or attracting new companies (Wu, 2008; Bartik & Ebert, 
                                                      
3 State-level investment tax credits have similarly proliferated over the past four decades, notwithstanding the repeal 
of the federal investment tax credit upon which they were modeled.  As of 2004, 40% of states offered a general, 
statewide tax credit on investment in machinery and buildings with an average rate exceeding 6% (Chirinko and 
Wilson, 2008 at Figure 1).  Research finds positive impact from these incentives on investment (although of varying 
magnitude) (Bartik, 2018).  We are not aware of research that considers the impact of general investment tax credits 
on entrepreneurial activity.  However, in their evaluation of the federal investment tax credit prior to its repeal, 
Auerbach and Summers (1979) credited such incentives with “crowding out of non-favored investment” at a level 
sufficient “to offset a large percentage of the increase in the stock of equipment resulting from use of the credit.”  
Accordingly, although likewise aimed at established firms, we would not expect state investment tax credits, as 
traditionally formulated, to have a positive impact on the creation of entrepreneurship.  The effects of general 
investment tax credits on entrepreneurship thus offer a useful counterpart against which to compare similar analysis 
of the impact of state R&D tax credits.  
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2011).  Today, R&D tax credits have increasingly been positioned as a catalyst of startup 
activity—a mechanism to spur growth in the states’ respective high-technology sectors by 
directly helping pre-revenue startups—above and beyond simply supporting established firms 
(Miller & Richard, 2010).   
However, in spite of the significant and growing state fiscal investment to foster 
entrepreneurship through R&D credits, the empirical evidence evaluating their impact is sparse.  
While an extensive literature investigates the impact of R&D tax credits on innovation, and 
another complementary literature considers how taxes broadly effect entry into 
entrepreneurship, there appears to be a lack of evidence on the question at the intersection of 
the two: how R&D fiscal incentives change the local production of entrepreneurship in those 
locations that adopt them. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to empirically 
evaluate this important issue.4  
To bridge this gap, we build on three related strands of economic literature that closely 
inform our area of study.  First, there is a large and productive literature on the impact of R&D 
tax credits on established firms. This work has established that such tax credits have a significant 
influence on R&D investment as well as wider economic effects (Mansfield, 1986; Jaffe, 1986; 
Katz, 1986; Grossman & Helpman, 1991; Hall & Van Reenen, 2000; Bloom, Griffith, & Van 
Reenen, 2002; Wilson, 2009; Wu 2005; Moretti & Wilson, 2014; Branstetter & Sakakibara, 
2002; and Rao, 2013).5  Furthermore, at a macroeconomic level, R&D tax credits appear to 
increase establishment-level dynamism among incumbent R&D-performing firms (Lucking, 
2019; Acemoglu et al., 2017). 
Second, there is a body of literature considering how tax policy in general (rather than 
R&D fiscal incentives specifically) impacts entry into entrepreneurship.  The findings of this 
                                                      
4 The closest related paper is Wu (2008), who considers how the introduction of state R&D credits changes the 
number of total active firms in the high technology sector.  However, Wu’s data does not allow him to actually 
separate between the entry and exit margin, or consider the varying quality of those firms that are marginally enticed 
to enter after the introduction of R&D credits. 
5 Drawn from Mukherjee, Abhiroop, Singh, Manpreet and Zaldokas, Alminas, “Do Corporate Taxes Hinder 
Innovation?”, June 22, 2014 draft. See Hall and Van Reenen (2000) for a comprehensive survey on this topic.  
Because firms are known to relabel other costs as R&D in an effort to claim tax credits (Griffith, 1996), it can be 
difficult to ascertain whether the R&D spending response to tax changes reflects changes in productive innovative 
inputs as opposed to creative accounting.  Recent research establishes that firms differ widely in the productivity of 
their R&D investments (Hirshleifer, Hsu, & Li, 2013) and these differences in innovative efficiency translate into 
differences in future sales (Cohen, Diether, & Malloy, 2013). 
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literature are mixed, and the effects often depend on the relative level of tax rates, structure of 
tax policy, risk tolerance of investors and the startups’ stage of growth, though some general 
patterns do emerge.  Generally speaking, entry into self-employment increases in response to 
lower marginal taxes (Bruce, 2000).  Cuts in relative and across the board tax rates faced by 
entrepreneurs would likewise increase entrepreneurial entry  (Gurley-Calvez & Bruce, 2013).  
Conversely, higher marginal tax rates and a more convex tax system reduce entry into self-
employment for people who were previously employed in innovative industries and occupations 
(Gentry & Hubbard, 2004).  Progressive tax structures have countervailing effects for high-
income agents, risk neutral investors on the one hand, and risk averse individuals, on the other.  
Since graduated rates tax gains more than subsidize losses, such rates discourage individuals 
from the former group from moving to the entrepreneurial sector and encourage it for the latter 
(Cullen & Gordon, 2016).  However, tax policy aimed at encouraging small business entry may 
come at the expense of discouraging later growth as preferential treatment is phased out and the 
government claims a larger share of payoffs for successful entrepreneurs (Holtz-Eakin, 1995; 
Gentry & Hubbard, 2003).  And, an across-the-board cut in tax rates would have a net positive 
impact on entrepreneurial spell length (Gurley-Calvez & Bruce, 2007). 6 
Finally, third, there are a small number of papers that have touched more directly upon 
the topic of R&D tax credits and entrepreneurship, even if not squarely looking at the impact of 
the former on the latter.  Babina and Howell (2018) use changes in state and federal R&D tax 
credits to study varying incentives to knowledge production in large firms and their spillovers 
into new startups, and Lokshin and Mohnen (2007) estimate the tax-price elasticity of R&D 
spending in the Netherlands across firm sizes, finding larger elasticities for smaller firms and 
hypothesizing that the credit plays a major role in helping small firms increase R&D 
expenditures in the face of more pressing capital constraints.   The paper that is closest to ours is 
Wu (2008), which links state R&D tax credits to the growth of the high tech sector.  Wu (2008) 
finds that state R&D tax credits have significant and positive impacts on the number of active 
high-technology establishments and as a share of business establishments overall within states.  
However, Wu (2008) leaves open the question as to whether any temporal rise observed reflects 
                                                      
6 Drawn from Gale and Brown’s (2013) survey of the literature considering how federal tax policy affects small 
business. 
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an increase in entrepreneurship, survival, or other aspects.  In conclusion, while much research 
has been done in adjacent areas, the empirical evidence on the impact of R&D tax credits on 
entrepreneurship continues to be largely missing. 
Studying this question presents not only challenges in systematic empirical analysis, but 
also the need to solve fundamental data issues at the core of entrepreneurship measurement.  As 
emphasized in Guzman and Stern (2017), ecosystem entrepreneurship cannot simply be 
summarized by the count of new firms, but instead represents three distinct margins, each 
varying independently across locations: the regional quantity, representing the number of firms 
being created in a location; the regional quality, representing the heterogeneous underlying 
potential of firms at founding and their regional distribution; and ecosystem effects, representing 
the better or worse performance across locations for startups founded with the same quality.  
State R&D tax credits could impact entrepreneurship across any one of these margins, or all of 
them, potentially even with each moving in different directions.  Without accounting 
systematically for each of these effects, the net-impact of state R&D tax credits on 
entrepreneurship (from the policy maker’s perspective) cannot be assessed.   
Therefore, developing an approach to create systematic regional measures of the quantity 
of entrepreneurship, its quality, and the ecosystem performance, in a way that can be done 
comprehensively across the United States (or another large geography) is a central and necessary 
requirement to careful study.  This is the question to which we now turn. 
 
III. Empirical Framework 
We now proceed to describe our empirical framework.  To do so, we build on our earlier 
work using business registration records and predictive analytics to measure the quality and 
quantity of entrepreneurship across regions (Guzman & Stern, 2015, 2016, 2017; Fazio et al., 
2017).  Then, we use these regional measures to setup a difference-in-differences empirical 
specification that takes advantage of the staggered introduction of tax credits to measure their 
impact on regional entrepreneurship outcomes.  We review each below. 
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A. Measuring Regional Entrepreneurship: An Entrepreneurial Quality Approach.7  
Our entrepreneurship measurement approach builds from Guzman and Stern (2016), 
where we develop a way to measure the founding quality of startups using predictive analytics 
and business registration records.  Our approach combines three interrelated insights.  First, as 
the challenges to reach a growth outcome as a sole proprietorship are formidable, a practical 
requirement for any entrepreneur to achieve growth is business registration (as a corporation, 
partnership, or limited liability company).  This practical requirement allows us to form a 
population sample of entrepreneurs “at risk” of growth at a similar (and foundational) stage of 
the entrepreneurial process.  Second, we are able to potentially distinguish among business 
registrants through the measurement of founding choices observable at or close to the time of 
registration.  For example, we can measure start-up characteristics (which result from the initial 
entrepreneurial choices in our model) such as whether the founders name the firm after 
themselves (eponymy), whether the firm is organized in order to facilitate equity financing (e.g., 
registering as a corporation or in Delaware), or whether the firm seeks intellectual property 
protection (e.g., a patent or trademark).  Third, though rare, we observe meaningful growth 
outcomes (such as achieving an IPO or high-value acquisition) for some firms.  Combining these 
insights, we estimate entrepreneurial quality by estimating the relationship between observed 
growth outcomes and start-up characteristics.   
That is, for a firm i born in region r at time t, with at-birth start-up characteristics 𝐾𝑖,𝑟,𝑡, 
we observe growth outcome 𝑔𝑖,𝑟,𝑡+𝑠  s years after founding and estimate:    
𝜃𝑖,𝑟,𝑡 = 𝑃(𝑔𝑖,𝑟,𝑡+𝑠|𝐾𝑖,𝑟,𝑡) = 𝑓(𝛼 + 𝛽𝐾𝑖,𝑟,𝑡)       
And use the predicted value of this regression as our measure of entrepreneurial quality.  
As long as the process by which start-up characteristics map to growth remain stable over 
time (an assumption which is itself testable), this mapping allows us to form an estimate of 
founding characteristics to entrepreneurial quality for any business registrant within our sample. 
We use these estimates to generate three entrepreneurship statistics capturing the level of 
                                                      
7 This section draws heavily (if not verbatim) from our prior work in Guzman and Stern (2016; 2017), where we 
originally introduce these measurement statistics. 
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entrepreneurial quality for a given population of start-ups, the potential for growth 
entrepreneurship within a given region and start-up cohort, and the performance over time of a 
regional entrepreneurial ecosystem in realizing the potential performance of firms founded 
within a given location and time period. 
The Entrepreneurial Quality Index (EQI). To create an index of entrepreneurial quality 
for any group of firms (e.g., all the firms within a particular cohort or a group of firms satisfying 
a particular condition), we simply take the average quality within that group. Specifically, in our 
regional analysis, we define the Entrepreneurial Quality Index (EQI) as an aggregate of quality at 
the region-year level by simply estimating the average of  𝜃𝑖,𝑟,𝑡 over that region: 
𝐸𝑄𝐼𝑟,𝑡 =
1
𝑁𝑟,𝑡
∑ 𝜃𝑖,𝑟,𝑡
𝑖∈{𝐼𝑟,𝑡}
 
where {𝐼𝑟,𝑡}  represents the set of all firms in region r and year t, and 𝑁𝑟,𝑡 represents the number 
of firms in that region-year. To ensure that our estimate of entrepreneurial quality for region r 
reflects the quality of start-ups in that location rather than simply assuming that start-ups from a 
given location are associated with a given level of quality, we exclude any location-specific 
measures from the vector of observable start-up characteristics. 
The Regional Entrepreneurship Cohort Potential Index (RECPI). From the perspective of 
a given region, the overall inherent potential for a cohort of start-ups combines both the quality 
of entrepreneurship in a region and the number of firms in such region (a measure of quantity). 
To do so, we define RECPI as simply 𝐸𝑄𝐼 multiplied by the number of firms in that region-year: 
RECPIr,t = EQIr,t × Nr,t 
Since our index multiplies the average probability of a firm in a region-year to achieve growth 
(quality) by the number of firms, it is, by definition, the expected number of growth events from 
a region-year given the start-up characteristics of a cohort at birth. This measure of course 
abstracts away from the ability of a region to realize the performance of start-ups founded within 
a given cohort (i.e., its ecosystem performance), and instead can be interpreted as a measure of 
the “potential” of a region given the “intrinsic” quality of firms at birth, which can then be 
affected by the impact of the entrepreneurial ecosystem, or shocks to the economy and the cohort 
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between the time of founding and a growth outcome. 
The Regional Ecosystem Acceleration Index (REAI). While RECPI estimates the 
expected number of growth events for a given group of firms, over time we can observe the 
realized number of growth events from that cohort. This difference can be interpreted as the 
relative ability of firms within a given region to grow, conditional on their initial entrepreneurial 
quality. Variation in ecosystem performance could result from differences across regional 
ecosystems in their ability to nurture the growth of start-up firms, or changes over time due to 
financing cycles or economic conditions. We define REAI as the ratio of realized growth events 
to expected growth events: 
𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐼𝑟,𝑡 =
# 𝑜𝑓 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑟,𝑡
𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑟,𝑡
 
A value of REAI above one indicates a region-cohort that realizes a greater than expected 
number of growth events (and a value below one indicates under-performance relative to 
expectations). REAI is a measure of a regional performance premium: the rate at which the 
regional business ecosystem supports high potential firms in the process of becoming growth 
firms. 
Together, EQI, RECPI, and REAI offer researchers and regional stakeholders the ability 
to undertake detailed evaluations (over time, and at different levels of geographic and sectorial 
granularity) of entrepreneurial quality and ecosystem performance. 
B. Empirical Specification.   
Building on this setup, we take advantage of the staggered introduction of tax incentives 
across different states in the United States to measure the difference in the average creation of 
local entrepreneurship for counties that have a tax incentive versus those that do not.  
Specifically, for a measure of entrepreneurship 𝑌𝑟,𝑡, estimated in county 𝑟 at time 𝑡, we estimate 
the specification 
𝑌𝑟,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛾𝑟 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝛽 𝐷𝑟,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑟,𝑡  
where 𝐷𝑖,𝑡 is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a tax incentive has been included and 0 otherwise, 
𝛾𝑟  are individual county level fixed effects, 𝜆𝑡 are year fixed effects, and 𝜖𝑟,𝑡 is an error term.  
 12 
 
 
The coefficient of interest is 𝛽, which estimates the average change in entrepreneurship (either 
RECPI, quality, or quantity) with and without the tax incentive.  After controlling for mean 
levels of county and year effects, the key identifying assumption is lack of correlation between 
the imposition of the policy and the trend in county-level entrepreneurship (which is itself 
testable). 
One common concern in difference-in-differences implementations for policy evaluation, 
like our case, is the existence of pre-trends.  Specifically, the concern is that for some 
unmeasured reason counties that are already in an upward or downward trend in 
entrepreneurship levels are also more likely to have R&D tax credits.  For example, more urban 
settings can be more conducive to R&D policies and have more startups, so that localized 
changes in urbanization, rather than the availability of R&D tax credits, can be driving measured 
differences in entrepreneurship between those counties that have the credit and those that do not.  
If these unobserved factors exist and are not fully controlled for, then the observed impact of the 
R&D tax credit will be biased.   We test for the existence of pre-trends in several ways, such as 
by running models that estimate pre-trends, by including additional controls that are most likely 
to be correlated with these pre-trends (e.g., regional GDP), and by plotting individual 
coefficients for each lag / lead to the tax incentive.    
Finally, a second concern is that the standard errors are biased downward when there 
exists correlation in the unobserved component across different observations in the same county 
(and which therefore are exposed to the same tax incentive), or between different counties in the 
same year.  To account for these concerns, we use the multi-way clustering approach (Cameron 
et al., 2011) and cluster our standard errors by both county and year.   
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IV. Data 
To implement the empirical framework described in Section III, we need to combine 
systematic measures of the quantity and quality of regional entrepreneurship with measures of tax 
policy and other control variables over time.  We construct a dataset including county-level 
measures of entrepreneurship from the Startup Cartography Project with measures of business tax 
credits from the Panel Database on Incentives and Taxes.  We therefore review each of these data 
sources in turn 
 
A. The Startup Cartography Project Dataset8 
The underlying dataset consists of all new business registrations across 34 US states 
(representing more than 80% of US GDP) from 1988 through 2012 that satisfy one of the 
following conditions: (a) a for-profit firm in the local jurisdiction or (b) a for-profit firm whose 
jurisdiction is Delaware but whose principal office address is in the local state. Our analysis 
excludes non-profit organizations as well as companies whose primary location is not in the 
state. The resulting dataset contains 18,916,895 observations.   
For each observation we construct variables related to: (i) growth outcomes (IPO or 
significant acquisition); (ii) firm characteristics based on business registration observables; and 
(iii) firm characteristics based on external data that can be directly linked to the firm (e.g. 
patents, trademarks). 
i. Growth Outcomes. The growth outcome, Growth, is a dummy variable equal 
to 1 if the firm has an initial public offering (IPO) or is acquired at a 
meaningful positive valuation within 6 years of registration as reported in the 
Thomson Reuters SDC database.9 
                                                      
8 This section draws heavily from this prior work in Guzman and Stern (2016), where we introduce business 
registration records and many of the measures used in this paper. 
9 Although the coverage of IPOs is likely to be nearly comprehensive, the SDC data set excludes some acquisitions. 
SDC captures their list of acquisitions by using over 200 news sources, SEC filings, trade publications, wires, and 
proprietary sources of investment banks, law firms, and other advisors (Churchwell, 2016). Barnes, Harp, and Oler 
(2014) compare the quality of the SDC data to acquisitions by public firms and find a 95% accuracy (Nette, 
Stegemoller, and Wintoki (2011), also perform a similar review). While we know this data not to be perfect, we 
believe it to have relatively good coverage of ‘high value’ acquisitions. We also note that none of the cited studies 
found significant false positives, suggesting that the only effect of the acquisitions we do not track will be an 
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ii. Firm Characteristic Measures Based on Business Registration Data. We first 
create two binary measures that relate to how the firm is registered: 
Corporation, which captures whether the firm is a corporation rather than an 
LLC or partnership, and Delaware, equal to one if the firm is registered in 
Delaware. We then create five additional measures based directly on the name 
of the firm. Eponymous is equal to 1 if the first, middle, or last name of the top 
managers is part of the name of the firm itself.10  Our last measure relates to 
the structure of the firm name. Based on our review of naming patterns of 
growth-oriented startups versus the full business registration database, a 
striking feature of growth-oriented firms is that the vast majority of their 
names are at most two words (plus perhaps one additional word to capture the 
organizational form, e.g. “Inc.”). We define Short Name to be equal to one if 
the entire firm name has three or less words, and zero otherwise.11 We then 
create several measures based on how the firm name reflects the industry or 
sector within which the firm is operating, taking advantage of the industry 
categorization of the US Cluster Mapping Project (“US CMP”) (Delgado, 
Porter, and Stern, 2016) and a text analysis approach. We develop seven such 
measures. The first three are associated with broad industry sectors and 
include whether a firm can be identified as local (Local), traded (Traded) or 
resource intensive (Resource Intensive). The other five industry groups are 
narrowly defined high technology sectors that are typically associated with 
high growth firms, including whether the firm is within the biotech (Biotech 
Sector), e-commerce (E-Commerce), other information technology (IT), 
medical devices (Medical Devices) or semiconductors (Semiconductor) space. 
  
                                                      
attenuation of our estimated coefficients. 
10 Belenzon, Chatterji, and Daley (2017a, 2017b) perform a more detailed analysis of the interaction between eponymy 
and firm performance finding an important negative relationship between an intent to use equity financing and 
eponymy. 
11 Companies such as Akamai or Biogen have sharp and distinctive names, whereas more traditional businesses often 
have long and descriptive names (e.g., “New England Commercial Realty Advisors, Inc.”).  
 15 
 
 
iii. Firm Characteristic Measures Based on External Observables. We also 
construct two measures related to quality based on data from the U.S. Patent 
and Trademark Office. Patent is equal to 1 if a firm holds a patent application 
within the first year and 0 otherwise. We include patents that are filed by the 
firm within the first year of registration and patents that are assigned to the 
firm within the first year from another entity (e.g., an inventor or another 
firm). Our second measure, Trademark, is equal to 1 if a firm applies for 
trademark protection within a year from registration. 
Entrepreneurial Quality Logit Model. We use this data to estimate a logit regression 
model that allows one to examine how the presence or absence of a startup characteristic 
correlates with the probability of growth (conditioning on the presence or absence of other 
startup characteristics). Table 1 reports our results for all startups between 1988 and 2006.  The 
results are striking.  We find an extremely strong (and robust) correlation between startup 
characteristics and the probability of growth. Substantial changes in the predicted likelihood of a 
growth outcome are associated with characteristics observable in real time from business 
registration records as well as characteristics observable with a lag (e.g., patent and trademark 
applications). On the one hand, startups founded as corporations are almost 390% more likely to 
grow.  Similarly, firms with short names, and those using biotech industry descriptors, are 
(respectively) close to 90% and 130% more likely to grow.  On the other, eponymous firms and 
those with local industry descriptors are 74% and 57% less likely to grow, respectively. Finally, 
these changes in predicted probabilities are multiplicative in nature: a startup that registers in 
Delaware and applies for a patent in its first year is 210 times more likely to grow than a firm 
that only registers in its home state and does not apply for intellectual property protection.12 
Quantitative Estimates Of Entrepreneurial Quantity And Quality-Adjusted Quantity. 
These findings can be used to construct, for every registered firm in the dataset, its underlying 
probability of growth at founding. The probability of growth for an average firm is very low (on 
the order of one in 3,500). However, for those firms with multiple startup characteristics that 
                                                      
12 It is very important to emphasize that these startup characteristics are not the causal drivers of growth, but instead 
are “digital signatures” that allow us to distinguish firms in terms of their entrepreneurial quality. Registering in 
Delaware or filing for a patent will not guarantee a growth outcome for a new business, but the firms that 
historically have engaged in those activities have been associated with skewed growth outcomes 
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positively predict growth, the probability of growth is dramatically higher (the top 1 percent of 
firms have a better than one in 100 chance of achieving growth outcomes). These estimates of 
entrepreneurial quality at the firm level can, in turn, be used to develop economic indices that 
simultaneously account for both the quantity and the quality of entrepreneurship (and which are 
outlined in the empirical framework section): 
• EQI—the Entrepreneurial Quality Index—the average growth potential (or 
“quality”) of any given group of new firms. 
• RECPI—the Regional Entrepreneurship Cohort Potential Index—the number 
of startups within a particular location or region expected to later achieve a 
significant growth outcome.  
• REAI—the Regional Entrepreneurship Acceleration Index—the ability of a 
region to convert entrepreneurial potential into realized growth.  
Each index calculates a different quantitative measure that incorporates the quality of 
entrepreneurship. The EQI, RECPI, and REAI indexes give a better indication than possible 
under traditional methods about just how skewed the distributions of growth potential and likely 
growth outcomes are (and whether and to what extent a greater number of small to medium-sized 
businesses could be expected to catalyze the same growth outcomes as a high-potential growth 
firm).13 Additionally, REAI systematically quantifies the ratio of realized to expected growth 
events for a given cohort of new firms, providing an indication of whether the ecosystem in 
which a cohort of new firms is located is conducive to growth (or not). As such, these indexes 
offer policymakers and stakeholders a better view of whether and to what extent their regions are 
attracting/generating startups with high-growth potential vs. helping/hampering these firms’ 
efforts to realize their potential. 
                                                      
13 The level of skewness of entrepreneurial quality is highly informative. It indicates how much more likely a startup 
at the high end of the entrepreneurial quality distribution is to grow than an average firm. If skewness were low, then 
adding several average firms could have as much regional impact as one high-growth-potential firm. But, if 
skewness is high (as the findings indicate), then a much larger number of firms with average growth potential is 
needed to generate the expected impact of one high-potential firm. Given the level of skewness observed, almost 
4,000 local limited liability companies (average firm) are needed to generate the same potential as only one new 
Delaware corporation with an early patent and trademark. Put another way, initial ambition/potential for growth is a 
key dimension of heterogeneity across new firms. The subset of high-potential-growth startups is very small and 
fundamentally different than the vast majority of new firms 
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Aggregating Across Locations.  Finally, we aggregate our estimates for all firms in our 
sample.  To do so, we use the registered ZIP Code of each company to identify each county 
using the HUD USPS ZIP Code crosswalk files.  We then aggregate across each county and year 
to estimate quality, quantity, RECPI and REAI based on the observed outcomes in each one.  
Our resulting dataset is made publicly available in the Startup Cartography Project website.  
 
B. Measuring R&D tax credits: The Panel Database on Incentives and Taxes14  
To incorporate the incidence and existence of R&D and investment tax credits into our 
study, we take advantage of a new dataset, The Panel Database on Incentives and Taxes (PDIT), 
created by Bartik (2017).  The PDIT estimates, from 1990 to 2015, marginal taxes and business 
incentives for an average firm in each of 47 cities in 33 states (reported in Figure 1B), and 45 
industries over 26 years. It simulates average taxes and incentives by considering the following 
scenario: a business in some industry i creates a new branch facility. That new facility is set up in 
some particular city c, in some state s, and starts operation in some year t. Taxes and incentives 
for the new facility are projected for the facility’s first 20 years of operation, and the facility is 
assumed to operate at the same scale during that time.15 To calculate state and local taxes for this 
new facility, data based on industry averages are used for the firm’s balance sheet (including for 
value-added, pretax profits, mix of property assets, employment, wages, and R&D spending). 
From this balance sheet information, and from information on state and local business tax rates, 
and information on rules for how incentives are determined based on firm characteristics, state 
and local taxes and incentives are calculated for each year of the assumed 20 years of operation 
of the new facility. The present value of the 20-year stream of such taxes and incentives is 
calculated using a discount rate of 12%. 
The database thus describes how business incentives vary over the term of a new business 
investment (from year 1 to year 20), and it breaks down incentives into different types, including 
                                                      
14 This section draws heavily (if not verbatim) from Bartik, 2017. 
15 In assigning taxes and incentives to this new facility over the 20 years, the same incentive and tax rules in place 
for year t are assumed to remain unchanged through year t + 20. This assumption can be seen as taking the 
perspective of a business that myopically projects current tax and incentive rules into the future. (When taxes and 
incentives are calculated for the same city and state in some future year t1, the tax rules and incentives for year t1 
are carried forward for 20 years.) 
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investment tax credits (ITCs) and research and development (R&D) tax credits.16,17 It allows 
these incentives to be subjected to descriptive analyses, including an examination of time trends 
in different types of incentives, and analysis of how incentives vary with a state’s economic 
prosperity or with an industry’s wage rates. 
C. Descriptive Statistics.  
Our dataset merges the Startup Cartography Project data with the PDIT, creating a 
complete panel of 25 overlapping US states from 1990 to 2010 with 30,093 and 5 variables.   
Table 1 reports summary statistics.  Obs, represents the count of individual registrations in each 
county-year. There are 397 new business registrants on average in a county and year.  However, 
the distribution is highly skewed, with a standard deviation of 1,948.  RECPI, represents our 
headline index, the quality-adjusted quantity of entrepreneurship.  It indicates the expected 
number of growth events given the founding characteristics of new businesses in a specific 
county and year.  The mean is 0.37 with a standard deviation of 2.   REAI, indicates the 
ecosystem performance index, which is the ratio of realized growth events versus predicted 
growth ones.  The mean 0.64 with a standard deviation of 6.   
We create two measures from the PDIT reflecting the presence or absence of the 
indicated tax credits in the states in question.  Has R&D Tax Credit is a binary variable equal to 
1 if the county has an R&D tax credit during that year and zero otherwise.  46% of the county-
year observations have an R&D tax credit, allowing well-balanced variation in our data.  To 
avoid issues particular to the transitioning year when the tax credit is introduced, we drop all 
county-years observations when the tax credit is introduced (N= 869), therefore simply 
observing the time before and after the credit.   Has Investment Credit is a binary variable equal 
                                                      
16The PDIT does not include all tax incentives offered across all states.  Instead, it centers on “incentives that are 
commonly used by medium to medium-large export-base firms. The goal of the PDIT is to measure the “standard 
deal” that would be offered to a medium-sized export-base new facility that the state and city wished to attract. 
These incentives may not be offered to all firms, but they are commonly offered to many firms.”  As such, 
Investment tax credits targeted at specific sectors (such as the biotechnology sector) or startup firms (such as angel 
investment tax credits) are not included in the PDIT panel. 
17 We distinguish general state investment tax credits from ones targeted towards encouraging early stage capital 
investment (which are not included in the Panel Database on Incentives and Taxes (PDIT) (Bartik, 2017) and 
therefore not the subject of our analysis).  Bell et al. (2013) finds that more than 30 states offered targeted angel 
investment tax credits as of 2012 and that these incentives were correlated positively with an increase in the quantity 
of state-level entrepreneurial activity within two years after introduction. 
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to 1 if the county has an investment credit during the year of the observation and zero otherwise. 
38% of the observations in our sample have an investment credit.  We drop the 721 observations 
representing county-year observations in which the credit is introduced. 
 
V. Empirical Results 
We now proceed to estimate the impact of R&D tax credits on the level of regional 
entrepreneurship through our difference-in-differences approach.  In Table 3, we report the 
difference in the quantity of newly founded companies (𝑂𝑏𝑠), the difference in the quality-
adjusted quantity of companies (𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑃𝐼) and difference on the performance of companies 
conditional on being founded (𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐼), for those counties that have an R&D tax credit versus 
those that do not.  For 𝑂𝑏𝑠 and 𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑃𝐼, we use the logarithm as our dependent variables to 
control for skewness in the variables and to allow easier interpretation of our estimates as 
elasticities.  However, we do not log 𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐼 as it is already a ratio that can be directly interpreted. 
Standard errors are clustered two-ways by year of observation and county to account for 
correlation in the error terms across either of those dimensions.   
Model 1 is a naïve model without any controls.  It reports the cross-sectional differences 
in the levels of entrepreneurship between locations that have R&D tax credits and those that do 
not.  In a way, they represent the perceived differences in entrepreneurship for the casual policy 
observer, or for those who might be doing a comparative analysis between regions at a point in 
time.  We observe substantially more entrepreneurship in counties with R&D credits than 
without.  Column (1) indicates that counties with R&D credits have 48% higher total quantity of 
firms.  Column (2) indicates that they have 64% higher total quality-adjusted quantity of firms.  
Interestingly, column (3) shows a negative relationship between REAI and the R&D credit.  
Firms in counties with R&D credits are 14% less likely to achieve growth outcomes compared to 
firms in counties that do not have the credit.  
Of course, cross-sectional differences like those of Model 1 are likely to suffer from 
significant omitted variable bias.  For example, it is likely that locations that are more urban 
simply have more economic development support (which will include tax credits) and more 
firms, so that R&D credits and entrepreneurship will be positively correlated due to the omitted 
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variable of urbanization.   As well, variation in the business cycle would also influence the 
founding and quality of new companies and policy introductions.  Unless the business cycle is 
accounted for, the estimates will be similarly biased.  
Model II is our preferred difference-in-differences estimate.  In Model II, we control for 
constant differences across counties by including county fixed-effects and for the business cycle 
effects and other national shocks by including year fixed-effects.  If the choice to introduce an 
R&D tax credit in any state is random after controlling for these two sources of endogeneity, 
then our estimate is identified.  
Highlighting the important role of omitted variables in determining which counties 
eventually offer R&D credits, our estimates decrease significantly from the naïve model to the 
differences in differences model.   Column (1) reports an average difference in the quantity of 
entrepreneurship of 7.5% between counties with R&D credits compared to those without, 
conditional on the fixed-effects.  Column (2) reports a difference of 7.6% for the quality adjusted 
quantity of entrepreneurship.  Finally, in Column (3) we report our estimate of the effect of R&D 
tax credits on the ecosystem performance, which is now equivalent to zero.  These results 
emphasize a meaningful main effect of R&D tax credits on the rate of entrepreneurship for 
counties in our sample.  Notably, the introduction of R&D tax credits increases the rate of 
entrepreneurship, but changes neither its composition nor its acceleration.  Both the quantity and 
the quality adjusted quantity of entrepreneurship increase in equal proportion.  While counties 
with an R&D tax credit enjoy an increase in the rate of business formation, that increase reflects 
the same mix of entrepreneurial quality previously found in the region.  Moreover, counties with 
an R&D credit are no more effective at helping startups to realize growth outcomes (relative to 
initial quality) than those without.  While lowering the capital cost of R&D leads to more 
employee departures for entrepreneurship (Babina & Howell, 2018), beyond potential knowledge 
spillovers, it does not appear to have broader ecosystem effects. 
Robustness Tests.  We now consider the potential threats to the validity of our estimate.  
As in most difference  in differences panel models, the main threat to validity is the potential role 
of pre-trends in our treated counties.  While we control for fixed characteristics of counties and 
time periods, there can potentially be region-specific omitted variables that drive both 
entrepreneurship levels and the introduction of R&D tax credits, making our results artificially 
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higher.  For example, localized economic and population growth would increase the level of 
entrepreneurship in a region and might lead to legislative choices such as the introduction of tax 
credits.  Conversely, however, the process of policymaking is often driven by state-level 
elements of politics that are more random, and might be uncorrelated with trends of 
entrepreneurship. In Models III and IV, we evaluate some potential threats to validity in our 
estimates by considering two obvious potential confounders, pre-trends and the state economy. 
In Model III, we control for county pre-trends by estimating the predicted value of 
entrepreneurship for each county if it had not implemented the R&D tax credit.  Specifically, for 
all counties, we estimate a county specific trend coefficient using only the observations where 
Has R&D Credit is zero, then predict the level of entrepreneurship (either quantity, quality-
adjusted quantity, or ecosystem effects) on all observations based on this trend.  We include 
these predicted values as individual county trends for all observations.  The point estimates of the 
impact of R&D tax credits are close to those of Model II (in fact, slightly higher) and the 
differences are not statistically significant. 
In Model IV, we control directly for the most obvious potential bias in the policy-making 
process of state legislatures, the state-specific economy, by including the state GDP as a control 
directly in our regression.  Once again, the point estimates are quite close to those of Model II, 
and the differences are not statistically significant.  
We move to a graphical analysis of pre-trends in Figure 2, where we report the year-
specific trends in the five years preceding the introduction of the R&D tax credit. To do so, we 
estimate regressions with time-specific coefficients in the years before and after the introduction 
of the R&D tax credit. Consistent with our other results, we do not observe any pre-trends in 
either the quantity or the quality-adjusted quantity of entrepreneurship.  
Together, our results provide compelling evidence of a lack of pre-trends in the 
introduction of state R&D tax credits.  This evidence suggests the threats to validity do not hold 
in our estimates and, therefore, they can be interpreted as causal.  
The Impact of State R&D Tax Credits Through Time.  While we have observed a mean 
difference in the effect of state R&D tax credits on regional entrepreneurship, there is reason to 
believe that this effect would vary over time.  In particular, we expect R&D tax credits to have 
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long-term effects on a local startup ecosystem.  For example, the credit might change not only 
the marginal cost of starting a company for those ideas already existing, but also the supply of 
new ideas themselves as entrepreneurs and investors are motivated by the expectation of lower 
capital costs, thus leading to longer-term effects on regional entrepreneurship. 
We study this possibility in Model V of Table 3. To do so, we change our core 
difference-in-differences specification in Model II to include time-varying effects through two 
variables.  The first variable, Years Before Credit, is equal to the (negative) number of years 
prior to the tax credit’s introduction, and zero when the tax credit has been introduced.  Its 
coefficient indicates the presence of pre-trends in the data.  The second variable Years After 
Credit, is equal to the number of years after the tax credit is introduced, and zero when it has not 
been included.  We also include a level effect of R&D tax credit by keeping our main variable 
Has R&D Credit.  Our estimates show no pre-trends, highlighting once again that there is no 
conditional endogeneity in the introduction of the tax credit.  We also show no effect on the main 
variable.  However, we see a positive and significant coefficient of 0.023 of our time trend on the 
level of entrepreneurship for both quantity and quality-adjusted quantity.  These estimates 
suggest that there is not an initial increase in entrepreneurship immediately following the 
introduction of a tax credit.  However, there is a subsequent improvement of 2% per year for 
every year the credit has been active. 
We revisit these estimates with yearly coefficients after treatment in Figure 2, and 
observe the same increasing pattern.  There is no increase in the level of entrepreneurship 
immediately following the introduction of the R&D tax credit.  However, there is an upward 
trend that begins after year 3 and continues up to year 14.  Consistent with our average increase 
of 2% per year in our regressions, we see a difference of about 20% in the level of 
entrepreneurship by year 10.  
Together, our results provide evidence showing that there is a significant effect of state 
R&D tax credits on the rate of entrepreneurship, but that this effect only accumulates through 
time.  Counties should expect to wait a few years following the introduction of a credit to see any 
initial effects and up to a decade to see effects that are substantial. 
 
 23 
 
 
VI. Investment Tax Credits 
As an additional exercise, we repeat our analysis studying the impact of a different type 
of tax credit, the investment tax credit, on entrepreneurship.  Table 4 repeats our estimates using 
the variable Has Investment Tax Credit as the independent variable.  The regressions are 
otherwise the same.  
Model I reports the naïve model, representing the cross-section correlation that would be 
observed by simply comparing the levels of entrepreneurship between those counties that have 
investment tax credits and those that do not.  As is the case with R&D tax credits, the correlation 
is positive and substantial.  Counties with investment tax credits have 71% higher quantity of 
entrepreneurship and 35% higher quality-adjusted quantity.  
The relationship changes in Model II, where we introduce county and year fixed effects.  
The relationship to entrepreneurship is now negative.  Investment tax credits are associated with 
a decrease of 5% in the quantity of entrepreneurship, though not statistically significant, and a 
decrease of 9% in the quality-adjusted quantity, which is statistically significant.  This is in sharp 
contrast to R&D tax credits, which showed a positive relationship to regional entrepreneurship.   
Models III and IV perform robustness tests on our data by including county pre-trends (as 
explained for Table 3) and state level GDP.  The results are mostly unchanged.  The coefficients 
are close to the baseline estimate of Model II and are not statistically different from them.  Figure 
3 also shows the pre-trends for the five years prior to the introduction of the credit.  While 
slightly noisier than the R&D credits, we do not observe any pre-trends on the process to 
introducing investment tax credits. 
Model V considers the time-specific impact of investment tax credits on 
entrepreneurship. Our estimates indicate that there is no main effect from investment tax credits 
on the level of entrepreneurship, but that there is a negative trend which is significant.  For each 
year that the investment tax credit is active, there is a decrease of 0.7% in the quantity, and 1.1% 
in the quality-adjusted quantity of entrepreneurship. 
We look at these effects in more detail in Figure 3, which reports time-specific level 
coefficients for each outcome.  There is a negative trend in the quantity of companies following 
the credit, but the pattern appears quite noisy.  It is more precise when considering the quality-
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adjusted quantity of entrepreneurship, where there is a negative trend that becomes more 
significant through time.   
Generally, we conclude the effects of the investment tax credit are negative on 
entrepreneurship, and more specifically high growth potential firms, suggesting a ‘crowding out’ 
effect on investment in the region as the investment tax credit is taken advantage of by large 
companies.  This stands in sharp contrast to the positive effects we identified for R&D credits, 
painting a nuanced picture of the role of tax incentives on entrepreneurship and its subsequent 
development, with both positive and negative effects being possible. 
 
VII. Conclusion 
Innovation and entrepreneurship are central to economic growth and an increasing focus 
of state-level economic development policy.  States are offering R&D tax credits to both 
encourage innovation and support high-technology clusters within regions.  With the locus of 
innovation shifting to startups in high-tech industries, and the majority of net new job creation 
resulting from the expansion of young high-potential growth firms (Haltiwanger et al., 2013; 
Guzman & Stern 2016), state-level R&D tax credits must create high growth entrepreneurship 
(either directly or via spillovers) to be an effective tool for economic development. 
R&D tax credits appear particularly well suited for the creation of endogenous high-
growth entrepreneurship in a region. These incentives lower the cost of capital and the 
incremental expense of research, encouraging investment in innovation and generating spillovers 
strengthening high-technology sectors within regions (Wu, 2008).  Historically, such tax credits 
were designed for and used by established industries, leaving open the question of whether and 
to what extent R&D tax credits generate the type of entrepreneurship needed for economic 
growth and/or greater realization of growth outcomes.  Our findings on state R&D tax credits 
offer a new lens through which to understand the impact of these fiscal incentives on both the 
rate of entrepreneurship and its composition, as well as the time it takes for effects to emerge.  
Our results on investment tax credits present an interesting counterpart against which the impacts 
of R&D tax credits may be compared and understood.  
While R&D tax credits increase the quantity and the quality-adjusted quantity of new 
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firms founded in equal proportion, investment tax credits change the mix of new firm formation, 
decreasing the rate of high-growth potential entrepreneurship credited with the majority of new 
job creation.  The causal impact of R&D and investment tax credits on entrepreneurship take 
time to emerge and build over time.  Over the long term, R&D tax credits empower regions to 
significantly increase both the quantity of entrepreneurship and number of expected growth 
outcomes.  Counties with R&D tax credits experience a rise in the rate of new firm formation 
and the number of expected growth outcomes by 2% per year and 20% over a ten-year period.  
Similarly, the negative impacts of investment tax credits on the quality-adjusted quantity of 
entrepreneurship build over time, decreasing the incidence of expected growth outcomes by 
1.2% per year and 12% in total over a ten-year period.  Last, but not least, our findings dampen 
expectations of achieving an indirect ecosystem effect, showing no causal relationship between 
the introduction of credits and later startup performance.  
Our findings have important implications for policy design.  First, and not surprisingly, 
the impact of tax incentives on entrepreneurship and its subsequent development is neither 
uniform nor unidirectional.  Both positive and negative effects are possible.  R&D tax credits 
generate the form of entrepreneurship needed for economic growth, while investment tax credits 
retard it.  States offering both R&D and investment tax credits in an effort to stimulate high-
growth entrepreneurship may be offering incentives that work at cross purposes. 
Second, the differential impact of R&D and investment tax credits on the composition of 
entrepreneurial entry – i.e., the rate of formation of main-street vs. high growth potential startups 
-- suggests that the structure of such incentives matters to later outcomes.  While R&D tax 
credits do generate substantial increases in the quantity and quality-adjusted quantity of new 
firms founded, they do not change the mix of main-street and innovation driven firms.  
Investment tax credits offered to established firms appear to crowd out the formation of new 
high-growth potential startups.  Our findings do not foreclose the possibility, however, that more 
targeted investment tax credits, such as those specifically tailored towards supporting the biotech 
industry or angel investment, could have the opposite effect.18  Our findings leave open the 
                                                      
18 Bell et al. (2013), for example, find an increase in the quantity of entrepreneurship in the two years following the 
implementation of an angel investment tax credit.  Further research is needed to study the impact of more tailored 
investment tax credits on the composition of new firm formation and, more specifically, the quality adjusted quality 
of entrepreneurship. Similarly, consideration of whether and to what extent the level of R&D credit offered and its 
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prospect that policy experimentation with the intensity and terms of these fiscal incentives could 
identify structures that better amplify the type of entrepreneurship most needed for later 
economic growth. 
Third, R&D tax credits offer no universal salve for accelerating entrepreneurial 
ecosystems.  R&D tax credits do generate meaningful increases in the formation rates of growth-
oriented startups.  Indeed, recent research confirms labor reallocation as one important 
mechanism through which this effect occurs (Babina & Howell, 2018).  However, counties with 
R&D credits are no more effective at helping startups to realize growth outcomes than those 
without.  Thus, while R&D tax credits will lead to creation of more growth-oriented startups, 
policymakers cannot also count on R&D tax credits to improve those startup’s performance.  
Policymakers should consider complementing R&D tax credits with other programs and 
initiatives to support startups as they scale. 
Finally, our findings suggest a time horizon over which policy impact from R&D and 
investment tax incentives may reasonably be expected.  R&D tax credits do not offer a “quick 
fix” for states seeking to stimulate regional economic growth through entrepreneurship (nor will 
investment tax credits spark a rapid decline in the number of expected growth outcomes from 
startups).  Instead, our cross-sectional results suggest that regional variation, and innovation and 
entrepreneurship initiatives, likely are stronger contributors to near term growth in the formation 
rates of high-growth potential startups.  And, the impact of R&D and investment tax incentives 
compound to substantial levels (albeit in opposite directions) over a ten-year period. 
  
                                                      
terms impact the composition of entrepreneurship generated (i.e., its extensive margin), while beyond the scope of 
this paper is likewise an important subject for future research. 
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Table 1: Entrepreneurial Quality Logit Model 
 
All Startups Founded Between 1988 to 2006 
Dependent Variable: IPO or Acquisition within 6 Years 
Incidence Rate Ratios Reported 
  (1) 
  
Eponymous 0.259*** 
  (0.0257) 
  
Short Name 1.883*** 
 (0.0406) 
  
Corporation 4.916*** 
 (0.204) 
  
Trademark 4.280*** 
 (0.264) 
Delaware Patent Interactions  
Delaware 33.21*** 
 (1.059) 
  
Patent 49.44*** 
 (2.970) 
  
Delaware and Patent 211.9*** 
 (10.40) 
  
Industry Descriptors  
     Local Industries 0.465*** 
 (0.0300) 
  
     Traded Industries 1.152*** 
 (0.0326) 
  
     Biotechnology 2.354*** 
 (0.197) 
  
     E-Commerce 1.075 
 (0.0511) 
  
     Medical Devices 1.297*** 
 (0.0664) 
  
     Semiconductor 1.862*** 
 (0.337) 
  
State FE Yes 
N 18916895 
pseudo R-sq 0.264 
We report the incidence rate-ratios of a logit model performed on all companies born between 1988 and 2008 in 
34 US states.  The predicted value of this regression is our measure of quality for individual firms, which we 
aggregate into regional statistics.  The outcome variable of the regression is Growth a binary variable equal to 1 if 
the firm achieves an IPO or acquisition within 6 years and 0 otherwise.  The regressors are all binary measures 
observed at or near the time of firm registration. Patent and Trademark are indicators developed by matching our 
data to USPTO records. They are equal to 1 of owns a patent or trademark within one year of founding (both 
granted and applied).  All other measures are developed directly from our business registration records.  Robust 
standard errors in parenthesis. The regression and data are described in further detail in Guzman and Stern (2016). 
*** p < .01. 
  
 
 
Table 2:  Summary Statistics 
 
  Count Mean Std. Dev. 
Startup Cartography Project    
Obs (Quantity of Entrepreneurship) 30093 397.107 1947.699 
RECPI (Quality-adjusted Quantity of 
Entrepreneurship) 
30093 0.358 2.03 
REAI (Ecosystem Effects) 30093 0.637 6.529 
Panel Database of Incentives and Taxes (PDIT)    
Has R&D Credit 29224 0.461 0.499 
Has Investment Credit 29372 0.383 0.486 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: The Impact of R&D Tax Credits on Regional Entrepreneurship 
 
 (1) 
Ln(Obs) 
(2) 
Ln(RECPI) 
(3) 
REAI 
Model I: Naive Model (no controls) 
Has R&D Credit 
 
0.477*** 
 
0.642*** 
 
-0.137** 
 
Model II: Difference-In-Differences (county, year F.E.) 
(0.102) (0.104) (0.0697) 
Has R&D Credit 0.0745* 0.0760** -0.0265 
 
Model III: Difference-In-Differences + County Level Pre-Trends 
(0.0389) (0.0376) (0.159) 
Has R&D Credit 0.0927** 0.104*** -0.0973 
 
Model IV: Difference-In-Differences + State GDP 
(0.0366) (0.0381) (0.139) 
Has R&D Credit 0.0651* 0.0641** -0.0193 
 (0.0337) (0.0302) (0.163) 
Log(State GDP) 1.016*** 1.293*** -0.776 
 
Model V: Difference-In-Differences + Pre/Post Time Effects 
(0.116) (0.125) (0.856) 
Years Before Credit (Negative values) 0.00242 0.00802 -0.00246 
 (0.00726) (0.00695) (0.0719) 
Has R&D Credit -0.0281 -0.0332 -0.0252 
 (0.0426) (0.0451) (0.173) 
Has R&D Credit X Years After Credit 0.0230*** 0.0224*** 0.000648 
 (0.00744) (0.00698) (0.0151) 
County level pre-trends is the predicted value of entrepreneurship for each county based on the non-credit 
years Standard errors clustered two ways by county and year. 
* p <.1, ** p <.05, *** p <.01 
  
 
 
Table 4: The Impact of Investment Tax Credits on Regional Entrepreneurship 
 
 (1) 
Ln(Obs) 
(2) 
Ln(RECPI) 
(3) 
REAI 
Model I: Naive Model (no controls) 
Has Investment Credit 
 
0.705*** 
 
0.352** 
 
-0.0586 
 
Model II: Difference-In-Differences (county, year F.E.) 
(0.123) (0.141) (0.115) 
Has Investment Credit -0.0527 -0.0912** 0.104 
 
Model III: Difference-In-Differences + County Level Pre-Trends 
(0.0385) (0.0392) (0.150) 
Has Investment Credit -0.0465 -0.0874** 0.264 
 
Model IV: Difference-In-Differences + State GDP 
(0.0380) (0.0394) (0.181) 
Has Investment Credit -0.0331 -0.0661* 0.0901 
 (0.0333) (0.0348) (0.143) 
Log(State GDP) 0.938*** 1.199*** -0.664 
 
Model V: Difference-In-Differences + Pre/Post Time Effects 
(0.140) (0.146) (0.812) 
Years Before Credit (Negative values) 0.0154 0.0122 -0.0172 
 (0.0175) (0.0147) (0.0617) 
Has Investment Credit -0.0397 -0.0359 0.220 
 (0.0565) (0.0554) (0.161) 
Has Investment Credit X Years After Credit -0.00608** -0.0114*** -0.0124 
 (0.00244) (0.00268) (0.0141) 
County level pre-trends is the predicted value of entrepreneurship for each county based on the non-credit 
years Standard errors clustered two ways by county and year. 
* p <.1, ** p <.05, *** p <.01 
  
 
FIGURES 
 
Figure 1: Distribution of Tax Credits 
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Figure 2: Year-by-Year Effects of R&D Tax Credits on Entrepreneurship 
 
  
Figure 3: Year-by-Year Effects of Investment Tax Credits on Entrepreneurship
 
  
  
Appendix 
 
 
 
Table A1: Summary Statistics of Firm-Level Dataset 
Outcome Variable                               Source Mean  Std Dev 
Growth                         SDC Platinum 
 0.00033  
 
0.01825  
Corporate Form Observables 
Corporation                    Bus. Reg. Records  0.52   0.50  
Delaware                       Bus. Reg. Records 
 0.031   0.172  
Name-Based Observables 
Short Name                     Bus. Reg. Records  0.49   0.63  
Eponymous                      Bus. Reg. Records 
 0.0679   0.2516  
Intellectual Property Observables 
Patent                         USPTO  0.0016   0.0404  
Trademark                      USPTO  0.0012   0.0351  
US CMP Observables (1) 
Local                          Estimated from name  0.19   0.40  
Traded (2) Estimated from name  0.135   0.341  
Traded Resource Int. Estimated from name  0.535   0.499  
Biotech Sector                 Estimated from name  0.002   0.044  
Ecommerce Sector               Estimated from name  0.052   0.222  
IT Sector                      Estimated from name  0.022   0.146  
Medical Dev. Sector            Estimated from name  0.028   0.166  
Semiconductor Sector           Estimated from name  0.000   0.020  
Observations                     29,961,838   
(1) US CMP Cluster Dummies are estimated by using a sample of 10M firms and 
comparing the incidence of each word in the name within and outside a cluster, then 
selecting the words that have the highest relative incidence as informative of a cluster. 
Firms get a value of 1 if they have any of those words in their name. The procedure is 
explained in detail in our Data Appendix.  
(2) Note that there are also firms that we cannot associate with local nor traded 
industries. 
 
  
  
 
Table A2: The Impact of R&D Tax Credits on Regional Entrepreneurship 
 
 (1) 
Ln(Obs) 
(2) 
Ln(RECPI) 
(3) 
REAI 
Model I: Naive Model (no controls) 
Has R&D Credit 
 
0.506*** 
 
0.661*** 
 
-0.142** 
 (0.0898) (0.101) (0.0715) 
Has Investment Credit 0.695*** 0.345** -0.0678 
 
Model II: Difference-In-Differences (county, year F.E.) 
(0.119) (0.135) (0.113) 
Has R&D Credit 0.0694* 0.0693* -0.00903 
 (0.0389) (0.0374) (0.162) 
Has Investment Credit -0.0426 -0.0822** 0.106 
 
Model III: Difference-In-Differences + County Level Pre-Trends 
(0.0386) (0.0404) (0.150) 
Has R&D Credit 0.0854** 0.0952** -0.0854 
 (0.0363) (0.0382) (0.146) 
Has Investment Credit -0.0441 -0.0909** -0.0306 
 
Model IV: Difference-In-Differences + State GDP 
(0.0362) (0.0407) (0.154) 
Has R&D Credit 0.0626* 0.0605* -0.00398 
 (0.0345) (0.0310) (0.167) 
Has Investment Credit -0.0240 -0.0583 0.0920 
 (0.0345) (0.0370) (0.145) 
Log(State GDP) 0.933*** 1.196*** -0.691 
 
Model V: Difference-In-Differences + Pre/Post Time Effects 
(0.123) (0.130) (0.835) 
Years Before R&D Credit (Negative values) -0.000820 0.00451 -0.00875 
 (0.00877) (0.00785) (0.0758) 
Has R&D Credit -0.0322 -0.0392 0.0108 
 (0.0499) (0.0494) (0.179) 
Has R&D Credit X Years After Credit 0.0228*** 0.0222*** -0.00137 
 (0.00786) (0.00722) (0.0158) 
Years Before Investment Credit (Negative values) 0.0185 0.0139 -0.0147 
 (0.0165) (0.0138) (0.0648) 
Has Investment Credit -0.0555 -0.0501 0.221 
 (0.0572) (0.0541) (0.165) 
Has Investment Credit X Years After Credit -0.00446* -0.00988*** -0.0128 
 (0.00262) (0.00265) (0.0137) 
County level pre-trends is the predicted value of entrepreneurship for each county based on the non-credit 
years Standard errors clustered two ways by county and year/ 
* p <.1, ** p <.05, *** p <.01 
 
 
